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The most widely accepted test of irresponsibility for a crime, on a
plea of insanity, is whether the accused had "capacity and reason suffi-
cient to enable him to distinguish right from wrong as to the particular
act in question . . ."I Conviction on the charge results in a verdict of
either "guilty," or "not guilty, by reason of insanity." The acceptance
of this test makes the formula the measure of justice rather than an
independent consideration of the accused's capacities for responsibility,
which is the basis of selection for responsible tasks in our society.
Capacity for responsibility is a qualitative faculty not equally bestowed
by the Creator, and can be materially altered by life experiences. It is
proposed to show that the present method of fixing criminal responsi-
bility is not just, is not especially protective of society, and is not in con-
sonance with present knowledge of human behavior.
The aim of law is protection of society and justice for the person
convicted of crime against the particular society or one of its members.
A society which cannot afford justice for individuals is either so insecure
or so depraved as to null the very purpose of its organization. A
formula defining responsibility or irresponsibility in human behavior
cannot do justice to individuals of unequal endowment in intellect, emo-
tional stability, or probable intervention of various mental illnesses.
These differences are often expressed in substantial disabilities which are
not exposed by mere knowing right from wrong, and disregard of these
must lead to legal perpetration of injustices.
The present yardstick of criminal irresponsibility discloses nothing
affirmative about possible mental handicaps at the time of the criminal
act, unless it shows that the accused possessed the consciousness and
physical force to wield the lethal weapon. Paradoxically, the required
knowledge of right from wrong is generally held to be of a moral
2
rather than of a legal nature; goodness from badness or evil in a social
sense in interhuman relationships. The legal presumption that everyone
has the requisite knowledge of criminal law precludes tests for determi-
nation of such knowledge.
1. State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241 (1889).
2. People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915).
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Moral concepts are largely formed in infancy and early childhood.
The wrong in doing injury to others, even killing of some domestic ani-
mals, and the Ten Commandments are indoctrinated by home, school,
and the churches. When mind is perverted by injury, disease, or failure
of function, the earliest instructions are the last to fail. Senile dementia
is peculiarly marked by failure of memory for recent events with fair
retention and recall of very remote memories. Amnesia victims who may
not recall their own identity generally answer correctly questions about
moral right from wrong. Mentally delapidated patients (chronic psy-
chotics, functional type), after years of confinement in mental hospitals,
have astounded lay persons with their retention of skills and learning
acquired prior to the mental breakdown. Thus, the musician can recall
much of his musical repertoire; a minister can deliver some of his tried
sermons; the artisan some of his special skills, and so on. These findings
are the rule rather than the exception. Moral concepts and trained
behavior are generally demonstrated as automatic responses; only on
special occasions does the individual require deliberative mentation to
express them. Persons in ambulatory delirium, from whatever cause.
may condemn themselves by the prevailing test; drug and alcohol de-
lirium are well known to have been associated with grave crimes. Al-
though wilfully induced intoxication is generally held as no excuse for
crime, it seems certain that the condition of delirium or pathologic
effect is neither intentional nor anticipated. Besides, there are many
other causes for ambulant, delirious states which are completely of an
involuntary nature. The important point is that such obviously sick
people can answer correctly to the right from wrong test, but will show
gross defect in reasoning "as not to know the nature and quality of the
act" charged against them which relates to intent, premeditation, and
deliberation requisite to a first degree murder conviction.
The magic power of precedent, the lack of agreement on more flexi-
ble principles, and the morbid social hostility towards criminals are the
probable causes for continuing the M'Naghten Rules as the yardstick
of criminal irresponsibility. These rules were formulated by 14 of the
15 highest Judges of England in 1843 as answers to five hypothetical
questions posed by the House of Lords. Of immediate interest is the
answer to questions II & III, to wit: "to establish a defense on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly proven that, at the time of com-
mitting the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing, or if he did know it that he did not know he
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was doing what was wrong."' 3 Mr. Justice Maule wrote a separate
opinion. He first protested the burden of answering to hypothetical
questions without arguments on the subject, and that the answers may
embarrass the future administration of justice. (His foresight was pro-
phetic.) He nevertheless gave as his opinion "To render a person irre-
sponsible for a crime on account of unsoundness of mind ... it has long
been understood and held, (the unsoundness of mind) be such as ren-
dered him incapable of knowing right from wrong."'4
The M'Naghten rules intended a firmer footing for the legal thinking
of the period. Law is interested primarily in the collective security and
an orderly functioning of a particular society. Application of law should
take cognizance of changes in public policy and keep abreast of scientific
progress relating to human behavior. The law concerned with criminal
liability is behind the times many years, perhaps, because the public
would rather despise than understand a known criminal. A formula
based upon "what has long been understood and held" over one hundred
years ago determines today whether a person accused of murder shall
live or die.
Crime often results from perversion or aberration of a sane mind.
It may fQllow sanctioned social activity, like the pathological reactions
from alcoholism, or the "oiled" tempers of inebriate celebrants. Neu-
rotic and psychopathic persons clash with the law largely as a result of
prevailing social pressures. Psychopaths are adversely influenced by the
inconsistencies in our moral, religious, and social practices. Among the
youth of Central Europe must be thousands of malignant psychopaths,
products of a hateful ideology and a protracted merciless war. They
understand the accepted right from wrong, but respond with perverted
attitudes towards social values; the preciousness of life is greatly dis-
counted. and the sacredness of private property even more discounted.
Combat trained soldiers returned to civilian pursuits may harbor hatreds
and a taste for blood. Press reports indicate a post-war rise in criminal
activity, most marked among those of military age of World War II,
in this country and abroad. Increased criminal activity and psycho-
pathologic behavior are well known aftermaths of wars.
Social resentment of crime is justified, but the criminals are entitled
to be understood. Society should recognize its share in the precipitation
of criminal behavior, although not entirely to blame. Fuller under-
standing of the criminal would lead to a higher level of justice while




still providing the desired protection for society. When crime is due to a
mental illness which is amenable to treatment, the criminal should be
placed under treatment; those handicapped by mental deficiency or
organic brain damage beyond remedy should be segregated under effec-
tive control; whether in a hospital or an institution with maximium
security facilities is a matter of secondary consideration.
These views have been widely accepted in dealing with juvenile delin-
quency and non-capital crimes. It is shown by the increasing number of
institutions to deal with such offenders, and the growing popularity with
courts of mental hygiene clinics and psychiatric consultation services.
There is no factual support for the legal presumption of uniform
capacity for responsible conduct in a conglomerate population, nor for
the myth that individuals are possessed with a "free will." The fallacy
of the first is within common knowledge. Every population has persons
of exceptional intellects, from the idiot to the superiorly endowed. It
has been reliably determined that about 10% of the general popula-
tion is of moronic or lower intelligence. During the last war it was
evident in dealing with millions of troops that intellect alone is not a
sufficient criterion for attaching responsibility; even those with superior
intellects may lack capacity for discharging responsibility. Knowledge
about human behavior has progressed far since "the wild beast test"
and "the child of fourteen years test," were the measuring rods for
legal responsibility.
The assumption that man functions by a "free will" is a myth thor-
oughly exploded. Psychoanalytic studies of human behavior have re-
vealed beyond question the dynamic influence of the subconscious. It
is within common experience that daily behavior is largely performed
thoughtlessly, that behavior patterns are often directed by undisclosed
motivations. The subconscious of the normal individual is finely regu-
lated to a working balance between primitive or infantile goals (the id),
the aspirations or desired esteem (super-ego), and the mediator (ego)
between the two relatively conflicting drives. Social behavior expresses
the effectiveness of ego control. This effectiveness may be readily dis-
turbed by disease, intoxication, and sudden change in emotional tension.
Predominance of the id suppresses inhibitory controls, permitting primi-
tive or socially unaccepted behavior. Under such behavior the elements
of premeditation and intention may be reduced to the type and quality
found in beasts. This is already recognized in jurisdictions which permit
a plea of "heat of passion" as a defense.
The inhibitive mechanism in human behavior is protective against self-
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debasement. Failure of function may indicate a powerful id or an inflated
super-ego; the former generally results in an amoral or lawless char-
acter, the latter, in behavior of opposite extreme such as exaggerated
piety and honesty. Chronic alcoholics, drug addicts, and persons with
other pronounced behavior disorder often evidence powerful demands
from the id, as well as from the super-ego. Thus alcoholics and psycho-
pathic personalities may voluntarily reduce themselves to the lowest
dregs of society and yet be ready to fight over the slightest aspersions
upon their persons or characters. This sensitiveness, of course, may
also be due to inadequacy of the super-ego. Murder is one of the most
debasing crimes against society. Yet, there are more would be murderers
than the records can show; the wish is not unknown even to completely
normal persons. The threshold for criminality varies with individuals
and in the same person at different times. Through factors beyond con-
trol of the individual the "free will" may become "the will of the wisp."
Clearly, the test of insanity based upon knowing right from wrong
can do grave injustice to many accused. Most psychotics (insane, in
legal language) retain indefinitely approved ethical concepts in relation
to specific deeds, and to the wrongness of murder in particular. This
presents an incongruous and an untenable legal situation which should
be resolved. An accused person may die if he knew right from wrong at
the time he committed the act, even though he may have been at the
time mentally disordered, as judged medically; he may yet escape punish-
ment, if he is found insane (committable to a mental institution) before,
during or after trial. A man might be found guilty because he knew
right from wrong but may not be executed because of being medically
insane. This generally requires that the insanity shall be manifest,
which must be taken to mean obvious, at some time after the crime, and,
of course, before execution. A patient on temporary leave from a mental
institution who commits murder or rape, knowing such acts are wrong
and punishable, will be punished in those jurisdictions which hold the
"right from wrong" test as the only criterion for responsibility. Prac-
tically all jurisdictions hold that an insane person is not to be executed,
yet the concept of responsibility which may lead to capital punishment
bears no determining relation to the concept of mental illness warranting
civil commitment to a mental institution. Why should there be different
standards of irresponsibility for the same person at different times?
The present formula for irresponsibility, indeed, gives a tenuous support




The special defence of "partial delusion" is no improvement. It is
inconceivable in the present state of our knowledge to speak of anybody
as partially insane and otherwise normal. Only relatives of insane per-
sons may be heard to speak of mental patients as being, say 85 percent
normal, to feel encouraged about the outlook. Such partially insane
persons, presumably delusional, must meet the standards of judgment
in relation to criminal acts as is expected from normal persons, accord-
ing to the M'Naghten rules. If the accused does not meet this pro-
tective standard, "and is not in other respects insane," he is punishable
as a normal person. If relief is sought from "in other respects insane,"
the probable outcome has already been considered.
The present application of the law does not provide maximum pro-
tection for society. Criminal law is punitive and also exemplary, pri-
marily to safeguard individuals in a society, and the orderly functioning
of the society itself. Capital punishment has not served well to mate-
rially reduce the incidence of murder. Religion with its promise of
reward in the hereafter for good deeds and, most unattractive, ever-
lasting punishment for grave sins has not effectively discouraged crimi-
nal activity even in religious persons. The annual rate of legal executions
and the increasing population in our penal institutions is evidence that
the present system is not successful despite its long history of operation,
that it is a system created out of fear rather than as an intelligent
approach to a problem. It cannot be said that it is the best system or
that it has not yet received sufficient trial. In other social endeavors
experience and newer knowledge have caused social, political and legal
changes.
The answer to the present dilemma is not for more indiscriminate
executions. The desired security and greater justice in our penal system
would be as well, if not better, served by a fairer and fuller consideration
of the criminal's mind at the time of the crime, and not alone by whether
he knew "right from wrong." Society has known a long time about
institutions of maximum security; many men have died in such institu-
tions as proof of their effectiveness. A verdict and judgment based
upon capacity for responsibility at the time of the crime would avoid
absolvence for some doubtful cases, while allowing a greater measure
of justice for mentally ill persons accused of crime but who cannot be
squeezed under the line of the protective formula.
The degree of guilt which attaches to a deed cannot be separated
from the state of mind of the accused at the time of the crime. Under
the established tests persons with severe forms of mental disorder may
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be held responsible. Such practice ignores realities concerning human
behavior, and cannot be justified by the mere lack of more adequate
tests or any difficulties in applying more just principles. This point of
view has been variously recognized for a long time, in instances too
numerous to recite. In Sage v. State, 91 Ind. 141 (1883), the court
stated that "the defendant in a criminal cause has the right to have his
general physical as well as his mental condition at the time of the com-
mission of the supposed crime explained to the jury . . . the better to
enable them to judge of its character." This is clearly a sane and
humane principle of justice. Legal minds are frequently slaves to time-
honored rules, and quite indifferent to a reasonable evaluation of the
life under consideration. It is not unusual for the prosecution to pass
over or ask exclusion of collateral information and demand that the
verdict be based entirely on the established test. Members of appellate
bodies have been known to summarize expert testimony on the probable
state of mind of the accused by asking "Well, did he know right from
wrong at the time?" Answers have had to be given in the affirmative,
even though the degree of mental disorder at the time precluded an
appreciation of the nature and quality of the act. A moment of reflec-
tion will convince that the two conditions are not synonymous and
may co-exist.
Weihofen and Overholser ' claim that "one who lacked comprehen-
sion of the nature and quality of his act cannot be said to have had any
intent with regard to that act." They ask the question, "how can one
justify holding a person guilty of a deliberate and premeditated killing
when he did not deliberate and premeditate, and, indeed, was incapable
of deliberating and premeditating?" In Torres v. State, 39 N.M. 191,
43 Pac. 2nd 929 (1935), the court defined deliberation as "a thinking
over with calm and reflective mind" (italics mine). In the case of
State v. Friedrich, 4 Wash. 204, 29 Pac. 1055 (1892), it was held
that when the statute divides murder into degrees, proof is required
of the actual existence of premeditation and deliberation to
convict in the first degree. The Oregon Code Ann. #23, 414 (1940),
requires the deliberation and premeditation be evidenced by "proof that
the design was formed and matured in cool blood, and not hastily upon
the occasion." Absence of the required premeditation and deliberation,
with a "reflective mind," does not preclude knowledge of right from
wrong as regards the particular act. The malignant psychopath tainted
5. WEIHOFEN, HENRY AND OVERHOLSER, WINFRED, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree
of a Crime, THE YALE L. J. 56:959, June 1947.
[Vol. 41
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
with the brutalities of a protracted war and possibly with an ideology
which totally discounts human values, when in the course of committing
petty crimes also commits an especially brutal and heinous murder, the
probabilities are that the graver crime was committed without the pre-
meditation and deliberation of a first degree murder. When a partici-
pant in a drunken brawl hits a fellow reveller with a lethal weapon and
kills him, there is not only the question of the requisite premeditation
and deliberation, but also whether he knew the nature and quality of
the act; he may readily have known that what he was doing was wrong.
One may question the full validity of Weihofen and Overholser's
statement that a mind so disordered as not to know the nature and qual-
ity of the act "cannot be said to have had any intent with regard to that
act. " This could be true for cases of acquired temporary or permanent
disorder of the mind. It probably would not apply to severe mental de-
fectives of mature bodies and infantile intelligence. The latter can show
sufficient intent without appreciating the nature and quality of the act.
The apparent brutal acts of children are frequently due to the insuf-
ficiency of knowledge of the nature and quality of their action; their
motivations are allowed ventilation because of this deficiency. One of
the authors apparently reversed himself from a previous opinion which
lie held on the meaning of "not to know the nature and quality of the
act." Fifteen years previously he believed there was no difference
between this clause and "right from wrong" test. The joined authors
reach the sound conclusion that "The theory that mental disorder,
though not so pronounced as to come within the tests of criminal
insanity, may nevertheless negative the particular intent requisite to the
crime charged, will continue to make progress in the courts.... Its logic
has not yet been refuted by any court, and it will not permanently be
disposed of by mere summary rejection."
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A concept of mental disorder in relation to criminal activity is pre-
sented. Medical appreciation of the problem supported by statute and
judicial opinion warrants considerable broadening of the present tests
of criminal irresponsibility. The principle of guilt for a criminal
act according to mental capacity for responsibility, is supported. The
whole issue so important to the basic tenets of the Federal consti-
tution, as the question of life or death for inhabitants of this country,
should not be left to state jurisdictions but controlled by Uniform Crim-
inal Liability Law. It should be abhorrent to judicial minds that any
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human being might suffer legal death by the sheer accident of residence
in a particular jurisdiction. One of the prime purposes of law is justice.
No just law can be ageless; it should bear relationship to a specific time
and society. It cannot have literal application for a changing and un-
predictable civilization. Law in essence is a book of rules by which a
society seeks security and order. The judiciary interprets the rules,
passes judgment, and imposes penalties for violations. This power vested
in the judiciary should not be exercised without regard for the human
beings affected, without awareness of change in the social and economic
pressures upon the persons involved, or without notice of newer knowl-
edge about human behavior. A just application of law would seem pos-
sible only through the instrumentality of thinking, living and feeling
minds, in relation to persons rather than acts or things. It is suggested
that the punishment be set to fit the accused or criminal, not the man
of one hundred years ago but the man today, under modern conditions
of social responsibility. Society could be more adequately protected
under such a rule; there would be less likelihood of abuses than is possi-
ble under the present system which often permits premature freedom
for murderers. Any difficulties in the application of the enunciated prin-
ciples can be resolved once recognized as a sound and just approach;
mere difficulty in application is not a warranted basis for rejection.
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